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CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN VENEZUELA: CAN 
THE ICC BRING JUSTICE TO VENEZUELAN VICTIMS? 
 
State parties to the Rome Statute submit to the jurisdiction of the 
International Criminal Court (ICC). This permanent and 
autonomous Court tries individuals for heinous international 
crimes, including crimes against humanity (CAH). Crimes such as 
murder, imprisonment, or torture, when committed as part of a 
widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian 
population, with knowledge of the attack, are known as CAH. 
Under the Statute, national jurisdictions are primarily responsible 
for investigating and prosecuting those responsible for 
international crimes. So, before it can assert jurisdiction, the ICC 
must determine that a state party is unwilling or unable to 
prosecute crimes against humanity in an effective way.  
Allegations of CAH in Venezuela, a state party to the Statute, 
have circulated in the news and social media since 2002. But in 
2017, the widespread and systematic murder, imprisonment, and 
torture, allegedly committed by Venezuelan security forces and 
colectivos (armed government groups), caught the international 
community’s attention. This Article argues that those crimes are 
CAH, and that the Venezuelan judiciary is unwilling and unable 
to genuinely prosecute the potential defendants. Accordingly, the 
ICC must assert jurisdiction and try Venezuela’s President 
Nicolás Maduro, Defense Minister Vladimir Padrino López, and 
I n t e r i o r  S e c r e t a r y  N é s t o r  R e v e r o l  f o r  C A H . 
 
Ayumary M. Fitzgerald1 
                                                 
 
 
1 Ayumary M. Fitzgerald earned an undergraduate degree in law in 2002 
at the Universidad Católica Andrés Bello. She also completed her 
International LLM degree at SMU Dedman School of Law in 2016.  
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Ayumary dedicates this Article to all those who participated in the 
protests that occurred in Venezuela between April and August 2017; to 
those who have been imprisoned and tortured for exercising their 
freedom of speech; and particularly to those who lost their lives for the 
dream of a free Venezuela. Gloria al Bravo Pueblo de Venezuela.  Mis 
ilusiones by San Luis (ft. Voz Veis and Apache). 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
On March 29, 2017, the Venezuelan Supreme Tribunal 
of Justice (TSJ)2 stripped members of the opposition-
controlled National Assembly3 of their parliamentary 
immunity and ruled it would assumed legislative powers.4 
Protests began once the decision was publicized.  
While Venezuelans peacefully took to the streets in 
defense of their fundamental rights, the Maduro regime 
responded strategically and systematically, targeting an 
unarmed civilian population with violence and terror.5 
Approximately, one person a day was killed since those 
protests began, and there were more than 450 investigations 
into human rights violations.6 Reportedly, the systematic 
                                                 
 
 
2 U.S. Supreme Court equivalent.  
3 U.S. Congress equivalent. 
4 See Venezuela: OAS SG Denounces Self-inflicted Coup d’État, 
ORGANIZATION+OF+AMERICAN+STATES+(Mar.+30,+2017), 
http://www.oas.org/en/media_center/press_release.asp?sCodigo=E-
019/17 [hereinafter OAS Denounces Coup d’État]; Andrew V. Pestano, 
Venezuela high court to take over National Assembly duties, UPI (Mar. 30, 
2017),+https://www.upi.com/Venezuela-high-court-to-take-over-
National-Assembly-duties/6171490883553; Rafael Romo, Venezuela's high 
court dissolves National Assembly, CNN (Mar. 30, 2017), 
https://www.cnn.com/2017/03/30/americas/venezuela-dissolves-
national-assembly/index.html. 
5 The Collapse of the Rule of Law in Venezuela: What the United States and the 
International Community Can Do to Restore Democracy: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on W. Hemisphere, Transnational Crime, Civilian Sec., Democracy, 
Human Rights, and Glob. Women’s Issues of the Senate Comm. on Foreign 
Relations, 115th Cong. 3 (2017) (statement of Luis Almagro Lemes, 
Secretary General, Organization of American States), [hereinafter 
Almagro’s Testimony at US Senate]. 
6 Id.  
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attacks were carried out by Venezuelan security forces and 
colectivos in thirteen states and Caracas—including in 
controlled environments such as military installations and 
other state institutions.7 
Then on November 16, 2017, Venezuela’s deposed 
Chief Prosecutor, Luisa Ortega Díaz petitioned the ICC to 
investigate Maduro, Padrino López, and Reverol.8 Ortega 
alleged that "8,290 deaths took place between 2015 and June 
2017 on government orders."9 She charged the government 
officials with "over 17,000 arbitrary and politically motivated 
arrests, hundreds of cases of torture, and the general 
paramilitarization of civilian population."10 She also claimed 
that "the crimes happened under the orders from the 
executive branch” and that they “represent a broad 
government strategy to cleanse dissident political views."11  
On February 7, 2018, the ICC prosecutor opened a 
preliminary examination.12  
                                                 
 
 




[hereinafter Crackdown on Dissent]. 








12 International Criminal Court, Statement of the Prosecutor of the 
International Criminal Court, Mrs. Fatou Bensouda, on opening Preliminary 
Examinations into the situations in the Philippines and in Venezuela, ICC 
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II. ICC MAY ASSERT JURISDICTION OVER CAH IN 
VENEZUELA. 
The preliminary examination process is conducted 
based on the facts and information available, as well as the 
overarching principles of independence, impartiality and 
objectivity.13 The analysis considers whether: (1) the Office 
of the Prosecutor’s (OTP) information provides a reasonable 
basis to believe that a crime within the Court’s jurisdiction 
has been or is being committed [jurisdiction]; (2) the cases 
may be admissible under Article 17 [admissibility]; and (3) 
there are substantial reasons to believe that an investigation 
would serve the interests of justice, accounting for the 
gravity of the crime and the interests of victims [interest of 
justice].14 The prosecutor has indicated that she will rarely 
                                                                                                                                  
 
 
(Feb. 8, 2018), https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=180208-
otp-stat. 
13 The Office of the Prosecutor, Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, ¶ 
25 (November 2013), 
http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/acb906/ [Hereinafter OTP Policy 
Paper]. (Although she is not yet taking an investigation, the prosecutor 
can seek additional information from states, U.N. organs, nonprofit 
organizations, and other parties, as well as receive oral or written 
testimony). Beth Van Schaak & Ronald C. Slye, International Criminal Law 
and Its Enforcement Cases and Materials, 144 (3d ed. 2015) [hereinafter Van 
Schaack] (citing Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
[hereinafter Rome Statute] art. 15(2), July 17, 1998 and International 
Criminal Court, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 104(2)). 
14 Rome Statute, supra note 13, art. 53(1)(a)-(c); see also Van Shaack, supra 
note 13, at 143 n.6 (explaining that Rule 48 of the Rule of Procedure and 
Evidence of the ICC makes clear that in determining whether there is a 
reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation under the prosecutors’ 
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decide not to proceed on an investigation based upon an 
evaluation of the interest of justice, consequently this Article 





The ICC asserts jurisdiction over cases grounded on 
subject matter, nationality or territoriality, and temporal 
basis.16 In her preliminary examination of the situation in 
Venezuela, the prosecutor must find that all three 
requirements are met to open an investigation.17 
ICC’s subject matter jurisdiction is limited to the most 
serious crimes concerning the international community: 
genocide, CAH, war crimes, and the crime of aggression.18 
Section III of this Article addresses this point fully and 
concludes that CAH were committed by Maduro, Padrino 
López, and Reverol, between April and August 2017.  
As to nationality or territoriality, the ICC can exercise 
jurisdiction over crimes committed on a state party’s 
                                                                                                                                  
 
 
Art. 15 propio motus, the prosecutor must consider the factors set out in 
Art. 53(1)(a)-(c)). 
15 Van Schaack, supra note 13, at 150. (“The Prosecutor will initiate an 
investigation unless there are substantial reasons to believe that an 
investigation would not serve the interests of justice when taking into 
account the gravity of the crime and the interests of victims.”). See Rome 
Statute, supra note 14, at Art. 53(1)(c). (“The interest of justice is then a 
countervailing consideration to the showing that there are reasonable 
grounds for believing that the requirements of complementarity and 
gravity have been met.”).  
16 Id. at 144. 
17 Id. 
18 Rome Statute, supra note 14, at Art. 5. 
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territory or by a state party’s national.19 The alleged CAH 
were committed in Venezuela, and Maduro, Padrino López, 
and Reverol are all Venezuelans. Since Venezuela is a State 
party, the ICC can assert jurisdiction. 
Finally, the ICC has temporal jurisdiction over events 
that occurred after July 1, 2002.20 Venezuela ratified the 
Rome Statute on June 7, 2000, hence agreeing to submit to 
the ICC’s jurisdiction with respect to CAH as of the Statute’s 
effective date.21 So the ICC can assert jurisdiction for CAH 
committed in Venezuela as of July 1, 2002. The CAH 
allegedly committed by Maduro, Padrino López, and 
Reverol between April and August 2017, are therefore 
within the ICC’s temporal jurisdiction. Thus, in her 
preliminary examination of the situation in Venezuela, the 
OTP would likely establish all three jurisdictional 
requirements. 
   
                                                 
 
 
19 Id. at Art. 12. 
20 See id. at Art. 11(1). Unless a State has made a declaration accepting the 
jurisdiction of the Court retroactively, if a State becomes a party to the 
Statute after July 1, 2002, the Statute enters into force on the first day of 
the month after the 60th day following the date of the deposit of its 
instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession. Id. at Art. 
126(2). 
21 See Preliminary Examination: Venezuela, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
COURT, https://www.icc-cpi.int/venezuela 
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b. ADMISSIBILITY 
 
After establishing jurisdiction, the OTP’s analysis will 
turn to admissibility. Admissibility is governed by Article 17 
of the Statute and requires two inquiries: complementarity 




The complementarity assessment is based on the 
underlying facts, as they exist at the time of the 
determination, and is subject to revision based on changed 
circumstances.23 In a preliminary examination, the OTP 
considers (1) whether a state has jurisdiction over the cases 
but is unwilling or unable to genuinely prosecute the 
accused; (2) if the state with jurisdiction has investigated and 
decided not to prosecute because it is unwilling or unable to 
genuinely prosecute the accused; and (3) if the accused has 
already been tried, whether an ICC trial would not be 
permitted under Article 20(3) of the Rome Statute.24 Here, 
                                                 
 
 
22 Van Schaack, supra note 13, at 145. In a preliminary examination, the 
OTP assesses admissibility regarding potential cases. Id. Once the 
prosecutor decides to investigate, the admissibility analysis turns to the 
particular suspects and cases before the court. Id. 
23 See OTP Policy Paper, supra note 13, at 15 ¶ 58 (relying on Regulation 
29(4), Regulations of the Office of the Prosecutor; Prosecutor v. Germain 
Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, ICC-01/04-01/07-1497, Judgment, ¶ 
56 (Sept. 25, 2009). 
24 Rome Statute, supra note 14, at Art. 17(1)(a)-(c). Also, Article 20(3) 
contains the ne bis in idem principle or rule against double jeopardy. The 
Rome Statute provides two exceptions to the rule: (1) when a trial took 
place to shield the accused from ICC jurisdiction over the crime; or (2) 
when a trial was not conducted independently or impartially to bring the 
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the double jeopardy principle contained in Article 20(3) will 
not concern the prosecutor’s preliminary examination 
because Venezuelan authorities have never tried, 
investigated, or prosecuted the potential defendants.  
Venezuela has jurisdiction to investigate and 
prosecute the crimes alleged in this Article because they 
were committed in its territory. So, during the preliminary 
examination, the OTP must consider the genuineness of an 
investigation and prosecution in Venezuela. The principle is 
that states bear the primary responsibility for preventing 
and punishing crimes, while proceedings before the ICC 
should remain exceptional.25 Consequently, where national 
systems remain inactive or are otherwise unwilling or 
unable to genuinely investigate and prosecute, the ICC must 
fill the gap left by the state’s failure to satisfy its duty.26 
The admissibility determination is not a judgment on 
the national justice system.27 Hence if a functioning justice 
system is not investigating or prosecuting the relevant cases, 
the determining factor is the absence of relevant 
proceedings.28 The absence of national proceedings for the 
same person and same conduct is then sufficient to make the 
case admissible.29 On this basis alone, the prosecutor could 
open an investigation because the potential defendants here, 
have never been investigated or prosecuted in Venezuela.  
                                                                                                                                  
 
 
accused to justice. These exceptions are also captured under Article 
17(2)(a)-(c). 
25 OTP Policy Paper, supra note 13, at 23 ¶ 100. 
26 Id. at 23 ¶ 100. 
27 Id. at 12 ¶ 46. 
28 Id.  
29 See id. at 12 ¶ 47 (relying on Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu 
Ngudjolo Chui). 
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But the assessment about a state’s inability or 
unwillingness to prosecute must be based on concrete facts, 
as they exist at the time of the review.30 To determine 
inability, the OTP may consider if due to a substantial 
collapse or unavailability of its judicial system, Venezuela is 
unable to obtain the accused or the necessary evidence or is 
unable to carry out its proceedings.31 To determine 
unwillingness, the OTP may consider principles of 
international law and whether proceedings in Venezuela 
would shield the accused, be unjustifiably delayed, or would 
not be conducted independently or impartially and thus 
would not bring the accused to justice.32  
Further, the OTP may consider, inter alia, the ability of 
the competent authorities to exercise their judicial powers in 
Venezuela; the absence of security for witnesses, 
investigators, prosecutors and judges; the absence of the 
required legislative framework to prosecute the same 
conduct that the ICC plans to pursue; the lack of adequate 
resources for effective investigations and prosecutions; as 
well as violations of fundamental rights of the accused.33 
When assessing unwillingness and inability, the OTP 
                                                 
 
 
30 See id. at 12 ¶ 47 (relying on Prosecutor v. Joseph Kony et al., Decision on 
the admissibility of the case under article 19(1) of the Statute, ICC-02/04-
01/05-377, 10 March 2009, ¶¶ 49-52). 
31 Rome Statute, supra note 14, Art. 17(3). 
32 See id. at Art. 17(2)(a)-(b). 
33 See OTP Policy Paper, supra note 13, at 14 ¶ 57 (relying on Prosecutor v. 
Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi, “Decision on the 
Admissibility of the Case against Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi”, ICC-01/11-
01/11-344-Red, 31 May 2013, ¶¶ 199-215; Prosecutor v. Saif Al-Islam 
Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi, “Decision on the Admissibility of the 
Case against Abdullah Al-Senussi”, ICC-01/11-01/11-466-Red, 11 
October 2013, ¶ 235). 
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considers whether any or a combination of those factors may 
impact the proceedings as to vitiate their genuineness.34  
 
III. The Venezuelan Government Is Unwilling Or Unable 
To Genuinely Prosecute Maduro, Padrino López, And 
Reverol Because There Is No Effective Separation Of 
Powers. The Maduro Regime Controls The Public 
Powers—Particularly, The Judiciary.  
 
Venezuela’s national public power is divided into 
Legislative (National Assembly), Executive, Judicial, Citizen 
(Ciudadano), and Electoral.35 The Citizen power is performed 
by the Republic’s Moral Council, which is composed by the 
People’s Defender, the Republic’s General Controller, and 
the Chief Prosecutor.36 The Chief Prosecutor is appointed by 
a two third vote of the National Assembly 37 and directs the 
public ministry for a period of seven years.38 The public 
ministry investigates and prosecutes criminal conduct.39 
Although there is a constitutional division of powers, 
the Maduro regime effectively controls the judiciary. Efforts 
to control the judiciary began in 2004, when (then) president 
Hugo Chávez and partisan lawmakers expanded the 
Supreme Tribunal of Justice (TSJ) from twenty to thirty-two 
                                                 
 
 
34 See id. at 14 ¶ 58.  
35 CONSTITUTION OF THE BOLIVARIAN REPUBLIC OF VENEZUELA, Art. 136 
https://www.oas.org/juridico/mla/sp/ven/sp_ven-int-const.html 
[hereinafter Venezuelan Constitution]. 
36 Id. Art. 273. The Chief Prosecutor is the U.S. Attorney General 
equivalent. 
37 Id. at Art. 279. 
38 Id. at Art. 284. 
39 Id. at Art. 285. 
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members and filled the new seats with supporters.40 Then in 
2010, Chávez’s lawmaker supporters accelerated the process 
for naming new TSJ justices,41 and before the National 
Assembly was installed that year, selected nine new TSJ 
justices.42 
Maduro’s political control over the TSJ translates 
directly into control over lower courts because the TSJ 
effectively controls the appointment and removal of lower 
court judges.43 In 2010, the TSJ’s Judicial Commission voided 
the appointment of 67 judges and appointed 1064 
nonpermanent judges.44 Then, in March 2012, the TSJ 
appointed 89 additional provisional judges.45 The 
Commission has also granted stability of tenure to hundreds 
of provisional and temporary judges.46 These new positions 
were not won through open competitions, as required by the 
Venezuelan constitution, but rather through promotions of 
                                                 
 
 
40 Tightening the Grip: Concentration and Abuse of Power in Chavez's 
Venezuela, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCh (Jul. 17, 2012), http:// 
www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/venezuela0712webwcover.p
df [hereinafter Tightening the Grip]. 
41 See id. at 10 (explaining that voters had reduced the pro-Cha ́vez 
majority in the National Assembly from close to 100% to approximately 
60% of the seats, so they made this move only five days after the 
legislative elections). 
42 See id. at 11 (explaining that to create the new vacancies, the TSJ gave 
several justices authorization to retire before the conclusion of their 
constitutional 12-year terms). 
43 See id.  
44 Id. at 11, n. 7.  
45 Id. 
46 Id. at 12. 
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provisional and temporary judges who had been appointed 
at the full discretion of the Commission.47 
The authorities’ failure, interference, intimidation, 
and arbitrary suspensions have undermined the 
independence and impartiality of Venezuela’s judges and 
prosecutors.48 According to the International Commission of 
Jurists (ICJ), the lack of security of tenure and transparency 
in the selection of prosecutors, as well as the allocation of 
criminal investigations ignoring the prosecutor’s experience 
and workload, have yielded the prosecutor’s inability or 
unwillingness to bring criminals to justice in an effective and 
equal manner.49 Additionally, with 70% of judges holding 
only provisional or temporary office, there is a climate of 
insecurity and impunity that surpasses 90% concerning 
common felonies, and even more for crimes involving 
violations of human rights.50  
Likewise, the Maduro Regime controls the Citizen 
and Legislative powers. The regime has gained control 
leveraging similar techniques as those used by Chávez. For 
instance, in December 2014—although the Constitution 
requires a two-thirds vote—the pro-Maduro National 
Assembly appointed the People’s Defender and the 
                                                 
 
 
47 Id.  
48 Venezuela: weak legal system threatens democracy, INTL. COMMISSION OF 
JURISTS (Jun. 5, 2014), https://www.icj.org/venezuela-weak-legal-
system-threatens-democracy-and-human-rights-reforms-urgently-
needed-new-report-says/ [hereinafter ICJ’s Venezuela: weak legal 
system]. 
49 See id.  
50 Id. 
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Republic’s General Controller, and ratified Luisa Ortega as 
Chief Prosecutor with just a simple majority.51  
Surprisingly, in December 2015, for the first time in 
seventeen years, the Venezuelan opposition won control of 
the National Assembly, altering the balance of power.52 But 
this only accelerated Maduro’s plan to control the public 
powers in Venezuela. In January 2017, Maduro announced 
an “economic state of emergency,” that allowed him to rule 
by decree.53 Then in February 2017, the TSJ bypassed the 
National Assembly to grant Maduro broad emergency 
powers over the economy.54 And in late March 2017, the TSJ 
stripped the opposition-controlled National Assembly’s 
members of their parliamentary immunity and ruled that it 
would assume legislative powers.55 Although the court 
                                                 
 
 








53 Frances Martel, Venezuela Declares “Economic emergency” That Allows 
President to Rule by Decree, BREITBART (Jan. 16, 2016), 
http://www.breitbart.com/national-security/2016/01/18/venezuela-
declares-economic-emergency/. 
54 Assoc. Press in Caracas, Venezuela under 'economic emergency' as court 
gives Maduro decree powers, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 11, 2016), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/feb/12/venezuela-under-
economic-emergency-as-court-gives-maduro-decree-powers. 
55 See Pestano, supra note 4, at 1(reporting that the TSJ accused the 
legislative body of overstepping its authority—primarily citing the 
opposition's efforts to remove Maduro from power—and held it in 
contempt. Ironically, the next day, Maduro “interceded” to undo, 
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rescinded a portion of that ruling, Maduro subsequently 
announced his plan to provide plenary power to a new 
national constituent assembly that could re-write the 
constitution.56 Finally, in August 2017, 545 delegates of the 
new national constituent assembly, elected under suspected 
fraud, were sworn in the legislative palace.57 The new 
constituent immediately dismissed Chief Prosecutor Luisa 
Ortega Diaz.58  
                                                                                                                                  
 
 
convening an emergency late-night dialogue, after which the court 
rescinded a portion of its ruling on the morning of April 1, 2017); Romo, 
supra note 4, at 1; see also OAS Denounces Coup d’État, supra note 4, at 1 
(reporting that the OAS Secretary General called for the urgent 
convocation of the Permanent Council under Article 20 of the 
Democratic Charter and stated that the situation has reached this point 
despite the warnings outlined in the reports of May 30, 2016 and March 
14, 2017). 
56 See Julia Jones & Stefano Pozzebon, Venezuelans reject constitutional 
rewrite in non-binding referendum, CNN (Jul. 17, 2017), 
https://www.cnn.com/2017/07/17/americas/venezuela-referendum-
votes/index.html (reporting that over seven million of Venezuelans 
voted in a non-binding referendum organized by the country's main 
opposition parties. The overwhelming majority voted against Maduro's 
plan. Maduro, of course, called the vote "a meaningless internal 
exercise."); see also Colin Dwyer, In Unofficial Vote, Venezuelans 




57 Cody Weddle & Patricia Mazzei, Venezuela installs new all-powerful 
assembly rejected by U.S., MIAMI HERALD (Aug. 04, 2017), 
http://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-
world/world/americas/venezuela/article165446552.html  
58 Patricia Mazzei, Chief prosecutor ousted as new Venezuelan assembly 
targets+Maduro+foes,+MIAMI+HERALD+(Aug.+05,+2017), 
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Hence, in its preliminary examination, the OTP will 
likely find complementarity based on the Venezuelan 
judiciary’s unwillingness to investigate and prosecute these 
potential defendants because the Maduro regime effectively 
controls the public powers.59 The regime controls the courts 
and the courts have manipulated the Venezuelan 
constitution and laws to consolidate all governmental 
authority under the regime’s control.60 Additionally, the 
OTP will likely find complementarity because, the 
Venezuela judiciary’s substantial collapse renders it unable 
it to prosecute heinous CAH. In Venezuela, there is a clear 
absence of security for witnesses, investigators, prosecutors 
and judges,61 as well as a lack of adequate resources for and 





59 See Secretary General Updated Report on Venezuela to the Permanent 
Council,+OAS+1-73,+1+(Mar.14,+2017)+OSG/128-17, 
http://www.oas.org/documents/eng/press/Informe-VZ-II-English-
Final-Signed.pdf [hereinafter OAS Second Report](“The rule of law no 
longer exists in Venezuela; it has been eliminated by a judiciary under 
the complete control of the Executive Branch that has invalidated every 
law passed by the National Assembly along with its constitutional 
powers”). 
60 Id. at 2; ICJ’s Venezuela: weak legal system, supra note 48, at 1; see also 
OAS Secretary General Invoked Democratic Charter and Convened 
Permanent Council on Venezuela OSG-243-16, 1-114, 65, May 30, 2016 
http://www.oas.org/documents/eng/press/OSG-243.en.pdf 
[hereinafter OAS First Report] (“there is currently no clear separation 
and independence of the branches of government in Venezuela, with the 
co-opting of the Judicial branch by the Executive branch being one of the 
clearest cases of this”). 
61 OAS Second Report, supra note 59, at 2; ICJ’s Venezuela: weak legal 
system, supra note 48, at 1. 
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 The gravity assessment is the key to distinguish 
crimes investigated by the ICC and crimes investigated in 
domestic systems.63 In this analysis, the OTP focuses on the 
crimes’ scale, nature, manner of commission, and impact.64 
These four factors are set in the ICC’s precedent and in 
OTP’s Regulation 29(2).65  
 To assess the crimes’ scale, the OTP considers the 
number of direct and indirect victims, the extent of the 
harm—particularly, the bodily or psychological harm caused 
to the victims and their families—and their geographical or 
temporal spread.66  As to the crimes’ nature, the OTP 
considers each offense’s specific elements.67  
                                                 
 
 
62 ICJ’s Venezuela: weak legal system, supra note 48, at 1. 
63 Stuart Ford, What Investigative Resources Does the International Criminal 
Court Need to Succeed?: A Gravity-Based Approach, 16 WASH. U. GLOBAL 
STUD. L. REV. 1, 5 (2017). 
64 Id. at 11 (relying on Prosecutor v. Abu Garda, ICC-02/05-02/09-243-Red, 
Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, ¶ 31 (Feb. 8, 2010)). See also 
Regulation 29(2), Regulations of the Office of the Prosecutor, ICC-BD/05-
01-09,+Effective+Apr.+23,+2009+https://www.icc-
cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/FFF97111-ECD6-40B5-9CDA-
792BCBE1E695/280253/ICCBD050109ENG.pdf [hereinafter Regulation 
29(2)]. 
65 Regulation 29(2), supra note 64; see also OTP Policy Paper, supra note 13, 
at 15 ¶ 61 (explaining that the assessment of gravity includes both 
quantitative and qualitative considerations). 
66 OTP Policy Paper, supra note 13, at 16 ¶ 62. 
67 Id. at 15 ¶ 63. 
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 Further, to assess the crimes’ manner of commission, 
the OTP considers the means employed to execute the crime, 
the perpetrator’s degree of participation and intent, and the 
extent to which the crimes were systematic, resulted from a 
plan or organized policy, or resulted from abuse of power or 
official capacity.68 The OTP also considers the use of cruelty, 
the victims’ vulnerability, any motives involving 
discrimination, or the use of rape and sexual violence as a 
means of destroying groups.69 Finally, to assess the crimes’ 
impact, the prosecutor considers the sufferings victims 
endured and their increased vulnerability; the terror 
subsequently instilled, or the social, economic and 
environmental damage inflicted on the affected 
communities.70  
 During its preliminary examination, the OTP will 
likely find that the alleged crimes meet the scale requirement 
because the harm caused to the victims and their families 
extended to hundreds of civilians killed and tortured, as 
well as thousands unlawfully imprisoned.71 These 
approximate stats are demonstrative: 167 deaths were 
reported in connection with civilian demonstrations,72 3,589 




69 Id. at 15-16 ¶ 64. 
70 Id. at 16 ¶ 65.  
71 See Crackdown on Dissent, supra note 7, at 54; see also OAS, Fourth 
Report on Venezuela OSG/ 445-17, 1-40, 5-6, Sep. 25, 2017 
http://scm.oas.org/pdfs/2017/CP38157REPORT.pdf [hereinafter OAS 
Fourth Report]; OAS, Third Report on Venezuela, 1-55, 19, 1 Jul. 19, 2017 
http://www.oas.org/documents/eng/press/TERCER-INFORME-
VENEZUELA-ENGLISH-Final-signed.pdf [hereinafter OAS Third 
Report].  
72 Crackdown on Dissent, supra note 7, at 54. 
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people were arrested in the demonstrations (as of July 4, 
2017), 73 16,000 were injured, thousands were victims of 
violence; 74 and at least 120 new cases of people tortured by 
various security agencies were reported.75 Additionally, the 
crimes large geographical or temporal spread includes 
criminal conduct committed over the course of, at least, five 
months and carried out, repeatedly, in thirteen states and 
Caracas.76  
                                                 
 
 
73 OAS Third Report, supra note 71, at 19 
74 OAS Fourth Report, supra note 71, at 5-6; compare Ford, supra note 63, at 
28 (relying on Situation in the Republic of Kenya, ICC-01/09-19-Corr, 
Decision Pursuant to Art. 15 of the Rome Statute on Authorization of an 
Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Kenya (Mar. 31, 2010)) 
(explaining that the ICC’s investigation about the situation in Kenya 
covered attacks by groups associated with two rival political parties that 
took place in the aftermath of a disputed election). 
75 OAS Third Report, supra note 71, at 33. The Centre for Studies and 
Analysis for Latin America (CASLA) has been denouncing to the ICC the 
systematic torture by the Venezuelan government since July 2016. Id.; 
compare Ford supra note 63 at 28 (relying on Situation in the Republic of 
Kenya, ICC-01/09-19-Corr, Decision Pursuant to Art. 15 of the Rome 
Statute on Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in the 
Republic of Kenya (Mar. 31, 2010)) (explaining that in Kenya, more than 
1,100 people were killed, at least 900 were raped, more than 3,500 were 
seriously injured, and more than 350,000 were displaced from their 
homes. And the killings, rapes and sexual violence were often done in a 
particularly brutal fashion). 
76 Crackdown on Dissent, supra note 7, at 1; compare Ford supra note 63 at 
28 (relying on Situation in the Republic of Kenya, ICC-01/09-19-Corr, 
Decision Pursuant to Art. 15 of the Rome Statute on Authorization of an 
Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Kenya (Mar. 31, 2010)) 
(explaining that, similarly, in Kenya, the attacks took place all over the 
country over a period of approximately two months, although the 
investigation apparently focused on fifteen locations). 
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 Likewise, the OTP will likely find that the crime’s 
nature is met because the alleged conduct meets the 
enumerated crimes of Article 7(1) of the Rome Statute.77 
Section III of this Article argues in detail that Maduro, 
Padrino López and Reverol could be held responsible for 
murder, imprisonment, and torture. 
 Moreover, the OTP will likely find that the alleged 
crimes meet the manner of commission factor because the 
crimes were systematic attacks resulting from state policy. 
Reportedly, the Venezuelan government’s strategic and 
systematic target of unarmed civilians resulted in one or two 
protestors killed each day.78 Section III(b) of this Article 
argues this point extensively, but the following reports are 
illustrative. For instance, between April and July 2017, the 
Venezuelan government deployed an excessive number of 
military and police officers throughout the country, as well 
as armored vehicles known as “whales” or “rhinoceroses”, 
which were used offensively to disperse protestors.79  
 The government also leveraged an indiscriminate and 
excessive use of tear gas canisters; officers used the 
containers of toxic gases, not only to disperse people, but to 
fire them directly and point-blank at the demonstrators, 
                                                 
 
 
77 See Rome Statute, supra note 14, at Art. 7(1)(a) (murder), (e) 
(imprisonment), (f) (torture). 
78 OAS Third Report supra note 71, at 1. 
79 Id. at 18-19. 
Human rights violations and abuses in the context of protests in the Bolivarian 
Republic of Venezuela from 1 April to 31 July 2017, COMMISSION OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS+(8,+Aug.+2017), 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/VE/HCReportVenezuel
a_1April-31July2017_EN.pdf [hereinafter OHCHR Report]. 
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seriously injuring and even killing some people.80 This 
conduct will likely lead the OTP to finding that the attacks 
resulted either from a plan or organized policy, or from 
abuse of power or official capacity.81 
 Finally, the OTP will likely find that the alleged 
crimes meet the impact factor. In Venezuela, at least two 
million displaced persons have had to emigrate for social, 
economic, and political reasons.82 54% of all children are 
malnourished.83 And as of July 25, 2017, there were 620 
political prisoners; more than 430% as compared to the 117 
political prisoners accounted for prior to the start of the 
demonstrations in April 2017.84 
  In sum, in addition to complementarity, the OTP is 
likely to find gravity and establish admissibility.85 Yet, to 
                                                 
 
 
80 OAS Third Report, supra note 71, at 19; compare Ford, supra note 63, at 
28-29 (relying on Situation in the Republic of Kenya, ICC-01/09-19-Corr, 
Decision Pursuant to Art. 15 of the Rome Statute on Authorization of an 
Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Kenya (Mar. 31, 2010)) 
(explaining that, like in Venezuela, in Kenya, the victims were largely 
civilians who were targeted because of their actual or perceived support 
for a rival group); see also OHCHR Report, supra note 82, at 20 (reporting 
that in some cases, people were arrested even though they were not 
demonstrating, just because they were perceived to support the 
opposition). 
81 See OTP Policy Paper, supra note 70 at 13 ¶ 63. 
82 OAS Fourth Report, supra note, 71 at 5-6. 
83 Id. at 5-6. 
84 Id. at 5.  
85 See Ford, supra note 63, at 29 (relying on Situation in the Republic of 
Kenya, ICC-01/09-19-Corr, Decision Pursuant to Art. 15 of the Rome 
Statute on Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in the 
Republic of Kenya (Mar. 31, 2010)) (explaining that regarding the Kenya 
investigation, the OTP concluded that the alleged acts constituted CAH 
and met the gravity threshold). 
148 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV. V. 26 
open an investigation, the OTP must find reasonable basis to 
believe that the alleged crimes are CAH under Article 7. The 
following section demonstrate this point. 
 
IV. SOS CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN VENEZUELA. 
After World War I, humanity has sought to 
criminalize individual conduct for heinous crimes 
committed by state actors that are the product of state action 
and policy; CAH is such heinous crime.86 The ICC can assert 
jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute CAH when any of 
the crimes enumerated in Article 7(1) of the Rome Statute—
such as murder, imprisonment, or torture—are committed as 
part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a 
civilian population, with knowledge of the attack.87 
 
a. ENUMERATED CRIMES 
 
i. MURDER, ARTICLE 7(1)(A) OF THE ROME 
STATUTE. 
 
                                                 
 
 
86 M. Cherif Bassiouni, Crimes Against Humanity Historical Evolution and 
Contemporary Application, CAMBRIGE (2011). Generally, to reach the 
heinous nature of an international crime, the criminal conduct must 
directly or indirectly threaten the international community’s peace and 
security; shock the international community’s conscience; affect multiple 
state’s public safety and economic interests; involve more than one 
state’s citizens; or require international cooperation because the criminal 
conduct’s is the product of state policy. Id. at 8-9. The OTP considers 
some of these factors when assessing gravity because gravity serves as 
the key to distinguish crimes investigated by the ICC from crimes 
investigated in domestic systems. See Ford, supra note 63, at 5. 
87 Rome Statute, supra note 14, at Art. 7(1). 
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Murder is an intentional killing without lawful 
justification88 that may be committed by act or omission.89 
Lawful justification involves excuses and defenses under 
customary criminal practice of the states, such as self-
defense, coercion, necessity, and reasonable mistake of law 
or fact.90 The death of the victim can be inferred from the 
facts to the case, but the prosecutor must prove the causal 
link between the killing and the death of the victim.91 
Between April and August 2017, at least 167 deaths 
were reported in connection with the demonstrations in 
Venezuela.92 As of July, security forces were allegedly 
responsible for at least fourty-six killings and colectivos for 
twenty-seven.93 On July 30, 2017, alone, the day the 
constituent assembly members were elected, at least twenty-
nine people were killed.94 Reportedly, 67 people were killed 
by firearms or by another type of projectile; thirty were aged 
twenty-one or younger; at least twenty-four were students 
and approximately fourteen were eighteen or younger.95   
                                                 
 
 
88 Bassiouni, supra note 87, at 365. 
89 Id. at 372 (relying on Prosecution v. Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-
01/08-15, Decision on the confirmation of charges, ¶ 132 Jun. 15, 2009; 
Prosecutor v. Katanga & Chui, case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, Decision on the 
confirmation of charges, ¶ 421, Sep. 30, 2008). 
90 Id. at 365. 
91 Id. at 372 (relying on Prosecution v. Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-
01/08-15, Decision on the confirmation of charges, ¶ 132 Jun. 15, 2009). 
92 Crackdown on Dissent, supra note 7, at 54. 
93 OHCHR Report, supra note 80, at 10-11; Crackdown on Dissent, supra 
note 7, at 54-55. 
94 Crackdown on Dissent, supra note 7, at 54. 
95 OAS Third Report, supra note 71, at 25. Of those who were not killed 
by firearms, at least eight were electrocuted and seventeen died of other 
wounds or accidents. Id. 
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Security forces systematically used their service 
weapons, less-lethal weapons (e.g. tear gas cans), and 
firearms with less-lethal ammunition (such as plastic pellets) 
to shoot at demonstrators at a close range, aiming at 
vulnerable parts of the body.96 For instance, reportedly, on 
April 26, 2017, a Bolivarian National Guard (GNB) officer, 
fired a tear-gas projectile, designed to be fired at long range, 
into Juan Pablo Pernalete’s chest from only fifteen meters 
away, killing him at impact.97 Similarly, on June 22, 2017, a 
GNB officer shot David Vallenilla in the thorax with a 
buckshot from the other side of a fence at an Air Force base 
in Caracas.98  
                                                 
 
 
96 OHCHR Report, supra note 80, at 12. 
97 Crackdown on Dissent, supra note 7, at 57 (reporting that Juan Pablo 
was a 20-year-old basketball player and public accounting student who 
was participating in an anti-government demonstration in Altamira, 
Caracas. The report also states that (then) Chief Prosecutor, Luisa Ortega 
Díaz, established that a GNB officer indeed fired the fatal round); 
OHCHR Report, supra note 80, at 12; see also Crackdown on Dissent, 
supra note 7, at 58 (similarly reporting that on June 17, 2017, 17-year-old, 
Neomar Lander was separated from his mother when GNB and 
Bolivarian National Police (PNB) officers moved to disperse the 
demonstration. She later found him dead and described him with a 
“hole” in his chest that was “just too big”).  
98 OHCHR Report, supra note 80, at 13 (stating that the act was recorded 
in video footage which showed David approaching the perimeter fence 
to throw what looked like a rock. The Chief Prosecutor’s Office reported 
that the 20-year-old was hit by buckshot in the thorax and ordered the 
detention of a Sargent of the Bolivarian Air Force. A criminal court in 
Caracas issued an arrest warrant against the Sargent, which had not been 
complied with at the time of the report); see also Crackdown on Dissent, 
supra note 7, at 57 (similarly reporting that on August 13, 2017, 16-year-
old student and soccer player, Luis Guillermo Espinoza, died several 
weeks after a GNB officer shot him in the head at point blank range 
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So the OTP will likely find that Venezuelan armed 
security forces intentionally killed demonstrators, without 
lawful justification,99 when they systematically used their 
service weapons to shoot at demonstrators, at a close range, 
aiming at vulnerable parts of the body.100  
 
ii. IMPRISONMENT, ARTICLE 7(1)(E) OF THE 
ROME STATUTE. 
 
Imprisonment is the unlawful deprivation of liberty 
of an individual without due process of law.101 The 
deprivation of liberty can be achieved by an act or omission 
with the intent to deprive the civilian of his physical liberty 
without due process of law.102 It can also be achieved with 
reasonable knowledge that the act or omission was likely to 
cause a deprivation of liberty without due process of law.103  
                                                                                                                                  
 
 
during a demonstration in San Diego, Carabobo state. Luis was trying to 
run away from GNB members on June 5 when three motorcycles 
surrounded him. Luis resisted the officers’ beating and then tried to run 
away. “One officer pointed his gun at Luis’s head and he stopped for a 
second,” “[t]he guard turned his head and Luis began to run again,” 
then a witness heard the shot and saw Luis on the floor). 
99 See Bassiouni, supra note 87, at 365. 
100 OHCHR Report, supra note 80, at 12. 
101 Bassiouni, supra note 87, at 444 (relying on Prosecutor v. Kordic & 
Cerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-T, Judgment, ¶ 192, Feb. 26, 2001).  
102 Id. (relying on Prosecutor v. Simic, Case No. IT-95-9. Trial Judgment, ¶¶ 
64-5, Oct. 17, 2003). 
103 Id. (relying on Prosecutor v. Simic, Case No. IT-95-9. Trial Judgment, ¶¶ 
64-5, Oct. 17, 2003). 
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To find imprisonment, the OTP considers several 
factors and Article 7’s express mandate.104 The factors 
include whether the arrest was the result of a valid warrant; 
whether detainees were informed of the reasons for the 
detention; whether formal charges were filed; whether the 
detainees were informed of their procedural rights, and 
whether the continued detention was lawful.105 
Additionally, Article 7 expressly prohibits imprisonment 
that is contrary to international law and other “other severe 
deprivation of physical liberty.”106 
In Venezuela, thousands of protesters and bystanders 
were unlawfully detained during the demonstrations, and 
many were subsequently prosecuted in military courts.107 
Again, approximately 3,589 were arrested in the 
demonstrations,108 and as of July 25, 2017, there were 
approximately 620 political prisoners.109 Reportedly, 
colectivos— civilian armed groups with no power to arrest 
under Venezuelan law—aided police and GNB officers’ 
unlawful detentions.110  
There were multiple violations including the lack of 
arrest warrants, incommunicado detention, lack of access to 
legal counsel, and breaches of the principle of presumption 
                                                 
 
 
104 Id. (relying on Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, Case No. IT-97-25, Judgment, ¶¶ 
119-22, Mar. 15, 2002). 
105 Id. (relying on Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, Case No. IT-97-25, Judgment, ¶¶ 
119-22, Mar. 15, 2002).  
106 Rome Statute, supra note 14, at Art. 7(1)(e); see also Bassiouni supra 
note 87, at 444. 
107 Crackdown on Dissent, supra note 7, at 1. 
108 OAS Third Report, supra note 71, at 19. 
109 OAS Fourth Report, supra note 71, at 5. 
110 Crackdown on Dissent, supra note 7, at 51. 
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of innocence.111 The UN High Commissioner for Human 
Rights (OHCHR) recorded multiples unlawful detentions 
including: Caracas (766), Zulia (630), Carabobo (608), 
Anzoátegui (413), Miranda (405), Lara (337), Táchira (334), 
Bolívar (271), and Aragua (269).112 
The OHCHR recorded multiple other irregularities. 
For instance, security forces arrested people without a court 
order and later claimed they had been caught in flagrante 
delicto; people were arrested on their way to demonstrations; 
others were detained while they were peacefully 
demonstrating; others were apprehended hours after they 
had taken part in a demonstration.113 In some cases, people 
were arrested even though they were not demonstrating, 
just because they were perceived to support the Venezuelan 
opposition.114  
Hence the OTP will likely find that under the state 
policy of the Maduro regime, state forces aided by colectivos 
imprisoned civilians or severely deprived them of their 
physical liberty. It will likely also find that officers 
committed unlawful arrests, without a valid warrant or 
informing of the reasons for the detention.115 Further, it will 
likely find that official arrests included incommunicado 
detention, lack of access to legal counsel and breaches of the 
principle of presumption of innocence.116 And the 
deprivation of liberty was directed against those who 
                                                 
 
 
111 OHCHR Report, supra note 80, at 20. 
112 Id. 
113 Id. (According to the OHCHR, a medical doctor witnessed national 
guards entering hospitals to arrest injured protestors). 
114 Id. 
115 Crackdown on Dissent, supra note 7, at 51. 
116 OHCHR Report, supra note 80, at 20. 
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protested against the Maduro regime, or were perceived to 
support the opposition.117  
 
iii. TORTURE, ARTICLE 7(1)(F) OF THE ROME 
STATUTE. 
 
Under the Statute, the definition of torture as a CAH 
does not require specific purpose, unlike the definition of 
torture as a war crime.118 Torture means the intentional 
infliction of severe pain or suffering, physical or mental, 
upon a person in custody or under control of the accused, 
which is not inherent or incidental to lawful sanctions.119 
The conduct must cause an important degree of pain and 
suffering to amount to torture [actus reus].120 The infliction of 
pain or suffering must be intentional [mens rea].121  
On June 15, 2017, the Centre for Studies and Analysis 
for Latin America (CASLA) reported an increase in torture in 
Venezuela since April 2017.122 Reportedly, once the victims 
were detained, government agents subjected detainees to 
severe infliction of pain and suffering, including severe 




118 Bassiouni, supra note 87, at 418 (relying on Prosecutor v. Bemba Gombo, 
Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08-15, Decision on the confirmation of charges, 
¶ 194-95 Jun. 15, 2009). 
119 Rome Statute, supra note 14, at Art. 7(2)(e). 
120 Bassiouni, supra note 87, at 418 (relying on Prosecutor v. Bemba Gombo, 
Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08-15, Decision on the confirmation of charges, 
¶ 193 Jun. 15, 2009).  
121 Id. (relying on Prosecutor v. Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08-
15, Decision on the confirmation of charges, ¶ 194-95 Jun. 15, 2009 and 
explaining that it excludes the requirement of knowledge set out in 
Article 30(3) of the Statute). 
122 OAS Third Report, supra note 71, at 33. 
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beatings, electric shocks, and asphyxiation among others.123 
CASLA reported at least 120 new cases of people tortured by 
various security agencies, particularly, by the GNB, PNB, the 
Bolivarian National Intelligence Service (SEBIN), and some 
local police from states and cities whose authorities are 
members of the government party.124 According to CASLA, 
the officers’ intention was not only to carry out orders but 
also to do the greatest possible physical damage, to punish 
their victims for demonstrating, and even as vengeance.125  
The officers applied systematic and gruesome 
methods of torture on detainees. First, officers applied toxic 
or tear gas powder directly to the victim’s face, which was 
then covered with plastic bags to make the effect even more 
overwhelming.126 Second, the officers shut the victims up in 
very small spaces (small armored cars, or together in groups 
in rooms no bigger than 2 meters x 2 meters) until they 
fainted or had serious respiratory difficulties.127 Third, 
officers pushed toxic powder into their victims’ nostrils to 
force them to open their mouths to breathe, and then forced 
them to eat human excrement.128 Lastly, officers threw tear 
gas canisters at their victims inside armored vehicles, where 
the victims were being detained, and then shut the vehicle’s 
door causing them to asphyxiate and faint.129 
                                                 
 
 
123 Crackdown on Dissent, supra note 7, at 1. 
124 OAS Third Report, supra note 71, at 33. The Centre for Studies and 
Analysis for Latin America (CASLA) has been denouncing to the ICC the 
systematic torture by the Venezuelan government since July 2016. Id.  
125 Id. at 33-34. 
126 Id. 
127 Id. 
128 OAS Third Report, supra note 71, at 33-34. 
129 Id. 
156 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV. V. 26 
The threat or perpetration of sexual violence as 
torture was another systematic form of abuse reported on 
detainees.130 80% of the new cases CASLA reported included 
claims by detainees that they had been stripped naked, 
threatened, or raped by officers.131 
Other forms of systematic torture included hits to the 
victim’s heads with the butts of weapons, helmets and blunt 
objects. Reports of kicks to the face, ribs and lumbar region 
were systematic in 100% of the cases presented.132 Electric 
shocks to the genitals, head and elbows, forcing victims to 
kneel or lie down to get at them more easily, handcuffing 
them hand and foot, covering their heads, or suspending 
them by the arms and allowing them to touch the floor only 
with the tips of their toes for hours on end, were also 
systematically practiced.133 
Hence it is likely that the OTP will find that under the 
Maduro regime’s state policy, officers inflicted a significant 
degree of pain and suffering upon civilians while they were 
in custody or under local police, GNB, PNB, or SEBIN’s 
control.134 Further, it will likely find that the pain and 
suffering suffered by civilians was the result of the officers’ 
unlawful treatment.135 The gruesome methods, which 
included sexual violence, likely demonstrate that the torture 
was knowingly committed, and that the officers’ intended to 






133 OAS Third Report, supra note 71, at 34. 
134 See id. at 33. 
135 See id. at 34. 
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carry out orders, but also to do the greatest damage possible 
in support of state policy.136 
 
b. WIDESPREAD OR SYSTEMATIC ATTACK DIRECTED 
AGAINST A CIVILIAN POPULATION. 
 
The ICC has interpreted the civilian population 
qualifier to mean “groups distinguishable by nationality, 
ethnicity or other distinguishable features,” including 
groups defined by its perceived political affiliation.137 CAH 
must have been committed as part of a “widespread or 
systematic” attack against such groups.138 The underlying 
principle was to exclude isolated and random acts, and 
ordinary crimes under national law, from the ambit of 
CAH.139 As such, the state or organizational policy mandate 
of Article 7(2)(a), is a necessary component of the 
widespread or systematic attack on the civilian 
population.140  
                                                 
 
 
136 See OAS Third Report, supra note 71, at 33-34. 
137 Van Schaack, supra note 13, at 444 (citing Situation in the Republic of 
Kenya in the Case of the Prosecutor v. Francis Kirimi Muthaura, Uhuru 
Muigai Kenyatta and Mohamend Hussein Ali (Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11) 
Decision on the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and 
(b) of the Rome Statute, para.110 (ICC Pre-Trail Chamber II (Jan. 23, 
2012))) (emphasis added) [hereinafter Prosecutor v. Kenyatta]. 
138 Rome Statute, supra note 14, at art. 7(1) (emphasis added). 
139 Leila Nadya Sadat, Crimes Against Humanity in the Modern Age, 107 
AM. J. INT'L L. 334, 353 n. 136 (2013) (relying on Machteld Boot, Rodney 
Dixon & Christopher K. Hall, Article 7: Crimes Against Humanity, in 
Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 117, 127 
(Otto Triffterer ed., 1999)). [hereinafter Sadat on CAH]. 
140 Id. at 353, n. 136 (relying on Machteld Boot, Rodney Dixon & 
Christopher K. Hall, Article 7: Crimes Against Humanity, in Commentary on 
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CAH must involve crimes “pursuant to or in 
furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit 
such attack.”141 Although there does not appear to be a per se 
state-action requirement, there does need to be some plan on 
behalf of some organization.142 So the Rome Statute 
eliminates a strict state-action requirement, but the 
defendant must have committed CAH as part of a plan and 
not for purely personal motives.143 Further, the ICC Pretrial 
Chamber II has concluded that an organization is established 
by sufficient evidence of (1) a hierarchically structured 
organization; (2) the existence of an effective system 
ensuring compliance by members with the rules and orders 
imposed by higher levels of command; (3) training and 
quasi-military characteristics; and (4) exercise of control over 
geographic areas and its population.144 
The Venezuelan government did not conceal its 
intention to violate the population’s human rights or to 
murder civilians.145 In fact, in April 2017, Maduro 
announced the Zamora Plan with which he intended to arm 
a million civilian militias (colectivos), assuring there would be 
“a rifle for each militia member” to respond to the 
protests.146 A second phase of the Zamora Plan was 
                                                                                                                                  
 
 
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 117, 127 (Otto Triffterer 
ed., 1999)). 
141 Rome Statute, supra note 14, at Art 7 (2)(a). 
142 Sadat, supra note 140, at 156. 
143 Id. at 156-57. 
144 Van Schaack, supra note 13, at 451 (citing Prosecutor v. Kenyatta, Pre 
Trial Chamber II ¶ 228). 
145 OAS Fourth Report, supra note 71, at 5.  
146 Id.  
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launched a month later.147 While there is no accessible public 
or official document explaining what Plan Zamora entails, 
military and public officials have referred to it to justify the 
use of military jurisdiction for civilians and to deploy the 
GNB to control demonstrations.148 The implementation of 
the Zamora Plan resulted in increased violence against 
demonstrators.149 
Consequently, state officers systematically used 
disproportionate force to suppress anti-government protests. 
Venezuelan security forces—including the Bolivarian 
National Guard (GNB), the Bolivarian National Police 
(PNB), the Bolivarian National Intelligence Services (SEBIN), 
and local police—aided by colectivos murdered, imprisoned, 
and tortured Venezuelan groups distinguishable by their 
opposition to the Maduro regime.150 The officers’ use of 
extreme and lethal force, caused hundreds of deaths and 
injuries.151  
Colectivos are civilian armed-groups that the Maduro 
regime and the state armed forces have leveraged to commit 
CAH in Venezuela. Although this Article does not elaborate 
further on this point, the OTP will likely consider colectivos 
quasi-state actors because they have established (1) a 
hierarchically structured organization; (2) an effective 
system ensuring compliance by members with the rules and 
orders imposed by higher levels of command exists; (3) they 
possess training and quasi-military characteristics; and (4) 
                                                 
 
 
147 OHCHR Report, supra note 80, at 8.  
148 Id. at 8. 
149 Id. 
150 See Crackdown on Dissent, supra note 7, at 54. 
151 See id. at 1. 
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they exercise of control over geographic areas and its 
population.152 Moreover, the association of colectivos and 
official armed-forces was apparent. Notably, colectivos 
alongside or in-sight of security forces suppressed 
demonstrations, at times, shooting live ammunition at 
protesters and detaining individuals who were then turned 
over to the security forces.153  
Lastly, the widespread murder, imprisonment, and 
torture of civilians by state armed-forces and colectivos were 
not isolated and random acts. The crimes were carried out 
repeatedly, across thirteen states and Caracas—including in 
controlled environments such as military installations and 
other state institutions—between April and August 2017.154 
Hence the OTP will likely find that state armed-forces and 
colectivos committed the widespread murder, imprisonment, 
and torture of civilians pursuant to or in furtherance of a 
state or organizational policy of the Maduro regime. 155 
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c. WITH KNOWLEDGE OF THE ATTACK. 
 
CAH must be committed with knowledge of the 
attack.156 As a matter of law, an attack directed against any 
civilian population need not be attributed to the person 
charged, neither does the person charged need to be the 
leader, or even a member, of the organization within the 
meaning of Article 7(2)(a).157 So the Statute does not require 
a tight link between the accused and the organization 
bearing the policy to commit the widespread or systematic 
attack.158 
In April 2017, the Maduro regime introduced the 
Zamora Plan, which called on colectivos and armed-forces to 
assist in responding to protests.159 Notably, OHCHR’s 
analysis revealed that, based on the types of injuries suffered 
by demonstrators, the use of force progressively escalated 
upon the implementation of Plan Zamora.160 So Venezuela’s 
President, (Maduro), Defense Minister (Padrino López), and 
Interior Secretary (Reverol) likely had knowledge of the 
crimes committed by state armed-forces and colectivos 
supporters of the regime. Moreover, reporters found no 
evidence that key high-level officials—including those who 
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knew or should have known about the widespread crimes—
had taken any steps to prevent and punish the crimes.161  
Lastly, the world has seen the brutal force used to 
prevent citizens from demonstrating against the Maduro 
regime in Venezuela.162 Maduro, Padrino López, and 
Reverol’s knowledge of the crimes is simply undeniable, and 




 The ICC can bring justice to Venezuelan victims, and 
the OTP has taken the first step by initiating a preliminary 
examination. During its review, the OTP will likely find a 
reasonable basis to believe that the heinous crimes 
committed in thirteen states and Caracas, between April and 
August 2017, are CAH. Likely, it will also find that the 
Maduro regime controls the Venezuelan judiciary as to 
render it unwilling and unable to genuinely prosecute the 
potential defendants. Accordingly, the Court can admit the 
case and assert jurisdiction.  
 The OTP will likely find that the Venezuelan 
government did not conceal its intention to harm civilians 
distinguishable because of their opposition to the Maduro 
regime. Maduro intended to arm colectivos, justified the use 
of military jurisdiction for civilians, and deployed the GNB 
to deter protesters under the Zamora Plan. Upon the Plan’s 
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implementation, violence against demonstrators increased, 
and state-forces and colectivos systematically murdered, 
imprisoned, and tortured hundreds of demonstrators. So the 
heinous crimes resulted from a plan or organized policy, or 
from an abuse of power or official capacity. The conduct left 
at least two million displaced persons and approximately 
620 political prisoners. Hence the OTP will likely conclude 
the crimes were committed as part of a widespread and 
systematic attack, directed against any civilian population, 
with knowledge of the attack.  
 The international community has finally heard 
Venezuelans’ SOS call. The OHCHR, OAS’s Secretary 
General, Human Rights Watch, CASLA, and Foro Penal 
Venezolano are among the institutions that have loudly 
condemned the CAH committed in Venezuela by the 
Maduro regime. But whether the ICC will ultimately bring 
justice to the Venezuelan victims remains to be seen, as the 
Court will face may obstacles, including getting custody of 
Venezuela’s President, Nicolás Maduro, Defense Minister, 
Vladimir Padrino López, and Interior Secretary, Néstor 
Reverol. For now, the ICC preliminary examination of the 
situation in Venezuela feels like a victory for Venezuelan 
victims. Venezuelan victims have lost many battles, many 
have lost their lives. So hope is, for now, what they continue 
to hold on to.   
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